Black Boxes That Shape Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria

Local government autonomy in Nigeria has long been a subject of constitutional debate and institutional contestation. While it is often discussed as a technical issue of administration or legislation, the reality is far more complex. Beneath the surface lies a web of power relations, institutional practices, and legal ambiguities that have become deeply entrenched.

Drawing from national newspaper reports spanning from 2010 to 2025, a close reading of Nigeria’s local government governance reveals how several black boxes continue to shape, and in some cases obstruct, the realization of true autonomy at the local level. These black boxes function by stabilizing certain governance practices, obscuring internal contradictions, and masking networks of influence and control.

One of the most enduring black boxes is the caretaker committee system. On the surface, it appears to be a temporary and lawful solution used by state governors when local government elections are delayed. In practice, however, it represents a politically expedient mechanism that circumvents democratic accountability. State governors routinely appoint political loyalists to head these committees. State Houses of Assembly often legitimize these appointments through tailored legislation. State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs), which should conduct local polls, frequently remain inactive or offer tacit support. The caretaker system, therefore, functions not through legality alone but through a network of actors who mutually reinforce each other’s authority and decisions. Over time, this network becomes taken for granted. It is rarely questioned except when civil society groups or legal advocates challenge it publicly or in court.

Closely tied to this is the black box of the State Independent Electoral Commissions. These bodies were established to manage local government elections and protect democratic integrity. In many states, however, SIECs have been compromised by political interference. Their budgets and leadership are controlled by the state executive, which limits their ability to act independently. Yet in public discourse, they are still referred to as electoral management bodies. This label conceals the political vulnerabilities and operational weaknesses they carry. As a result, their performance rarely comes under scrutiny unless their failures become too glaring to ignore.

There is also an emerging black box that represents a reformist ideal. This is the proposal to transfer the responsibility of conducting local government elections from SIECs to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Advocates argue that INEC, with its national reach and relative credibility, is better positioned to oversee impartial and regular elections. This proposal has gained traction among civil society organizations, youth movements, legal experts, and members of the National Assembly. However, even this solution depends on a broader network of support. It requires constitutional amendments, political agreement across federal and state levels, and consistent funding. Until these elements align, the model remains fragile and easily contested.

Another critical but often invisible black box is fiscal federalism. Although the constitution mandates financial independence for local governments, most states continue to operate joint accounts that allow governors to control local funds. This arrangement blackboxes the illusion of autonomy. Local governments are described as independent in law, yet they function within a structure that undermines their financial capacity. Reform efforts have been proposed, including direct allocation and increased financial transparency. These efforts, however, face resistance from those who benefit from the existing structure.

Our analyst notes that understanding local government autonomy in Nigeria requires more than legal analysis or administrative reform. It calls for a deeper look into the black boxes that obscure the true dynamics of governance. Caretaker committees, compromised electoral bodies, fragile reforms, and financial dependence are all part of a larger ecosystem that determines how power is exercised at the grassroots level. Actor-Network Theory offers a valuable lens for uncovering these hidden networks. For Nigeria to achieve genuine local government autonomy, it must not only design better systems but also confront and dismantle the entrenched practices that have been blackboxed for far too long.