Crypto Trends

Distortion Patterns and Web Text Size Analysis in Webcam Peeking Attacks

Abstract and I. Introduction

II. Threat Model & Background

III. Webcam Peeking through Glasses

IV. Reflection Recognizability & Factors

V. Cyberspace Textual Target Susceptibility

VI. Website Recognition

VII. Discussion

VIII. Related Work

IX. Conclusion, Acknowledgment, and References

APPENDIX A: Equipment Information

APPENDIX B: Viewing Angle Model

APPENDIX C: Video Conferencing Platform Behaviors

APPENDIX D: Distortion Analysis

APPENDIX E: Web Textual Targets

APPENDIX D DISTORTION ANALYSIS

TABLE IIITEXT SIZES OF WEB CONTENTSTABLE IIITEXT SIZES OF WEB CONTENTS

Different from previous works [25], [26], motion blur and out-of-focus blurs that are theoretically uniform within a single frame is not the number one limiting factors in the webcam peeking threat model because of the relatively shorter exposure time and closer, more constant camera-object distance. Instead, distortions with intra-frame and inter-frame variance dominate which suggests the image quality cannot be easily improved with PSF deconvolution as in [25] and new image enhancing techniques are needed.

APPENDIX E WEB TEXTUAL TARGETS

Web Text Design Conventions. Despite the fact that the default CSS font sizes are decided by web browser vendors separately, we find many of them follow the W3C recommendation [14], where H1, H2, H3 headers’ font sizes are 2, 1.5, 1.17 em respectively. To briefly explain, a text size of x em means the size is x times the current body font size of the web page [20] which is usually the same as the font size of paragraph (P) elements. Nevertheless, we note that web design standards are lacking, and designers have a large degree of freedom of choosing their own text designs. Sometimes bigger fonts are preferred in order to make the websites more

Fig. 15. Different strengths of Gaussian filtering applied on three pairs of glasses. The reflected texts and their CWSSIM scores in each case are shown. Different glasses require different strengths of filters to reduce the reflection. We thus advocate an individual reflection testing procedure to determine protection scheme and settings.Fig. 15. Different strengths of Gaussian filtering applied on three pairs of glasses. The reflected texts and their CWSSIM scores in each case are shown. Different glasses require different strengths of filters to reduce the reflection. We thus advocate an individual reflection testing procedure to determine protection scheme and settings.

stylish and eye-catching. In this section, we thus investigate both conventional and more stylish web text sizes.

Text Sizes. We summarize the text sizes investigated in Table III where the cap height values are measured with the Acer laptop and default OS and browser settings.

G1 and G2: The first group represents the median HTML P, H1, H2, H3 texts of the 1000 websites. [48] reports that the median size of the P elements is about 12 pt and H1, H2, H3 sizes are close to the 2, 1.5, 1.17 em ratios recommended [14]. We thus use these point sizes for 1 and specify the corresponding cap heights in Table III. The second group represents the largest HTML P, H1, H2, H3 texts of the 1000 websites in [48] with the same recommended em ratios for the headers. [48] finds that about 4% of the 1000 websites use a P size as large as 21 pt. This results in H1, H2, H3 sizes of 25, 32, and 45 pt respectively.

G3: The third group represents the 117 big-font websites’ texts. We manually inspected all the 427 websites archived on SiteInspire [10]. The reason for manual analysis rather than scraping is that many large-font texts on the websites are embedded in the form of images instead of HTML text elements in order to create more flexible font styles. We then selected 117 of them based on the following criteria: (1) The webpage is still active. (2) The largest static texts that enable an adversary to identify the website through google search have a cap height of at least 10 mm when displayed on the Acer laptop. We show the different quantiles of the largest physical cap heights on the 117 websites and the converted point sizes in Table III. We find that most websites in G3 are related to art, design, and cinema industry which like to present their stylish design skills but unfortunately make the web peeking attack easier. About 1/3 of the websites are designers’ or studios’ websites that computer science/security researchers may overlook. Furthermore, 72 out of the 117 websites are ranked on Alexa from 38 to 8,851,402 with 5 websites among the top 10,000.

Fig. 16. A spectrum of Alexa top 100 websites that are found to be the easiest (upper) and hardest (lower) to recognize in our evaluation of website recognition under webcam peeking attacks. Screenshots of each website are rotated by 90 degrees and concatenated horizontally. Correlations scores between the rank of website recognition easiness and website pixel values’ average and standard deviation are -0.33 and 0.45 respectively, suggesting darker websites with high-contrast graphical contents are easier to recognize.Fig. 16. A spectrum of Alexa top 100 websites that are found to be the easiest (upper) and hardest (lower) to recognize in our evaluation of website recognition under webcam peeking attacks. Screenshots of each website are rotated by 90 degrees and concatenated horizontally. Correlations scores between the rank of website recognition easiness and website pixel values’ average and standard deviation are -0.33 and 0.45 respectively, suggesting darker websites with high-contrast graphical contents are easier to recognize.

Fig. 17. (a) The comparison between reconstructed images when the video is recorded locally on the victim device and over Zoom with different network upload bandwidths. (b) Changes of reflection recognizability with different text-background color contrast. (c) Changes of reflection recognizability with different background colors (reflectance). We tested gray-scale colors with the same RGB values, which have relatively uniform reflectance on the visible light spectrum. (d) Changes of reflection recognizability under different environmental light intensities. (e) Changes in reflection recognizability with different screen brightness.Fig. 17. (a) The comparison between reconstructed images when the video is recorded locally on the victim device and over Zoom with different network upload bandwidths. (b) Changes of reflection recognizability with different text-background color contrast. (c) Changes of reflection recognizability with different background colors (reflectance). We tested gray-scale colors with the same RGB values, which have relatively uniform reflectance on the visible light spectrum. (d) Changes of reflection recognizability under different environmental light intensities. (e) Changes in reflection recognizability with different screen brightness.

Authors:

(1) Yan Long, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA ([email protected]);

(2) Chen Yan, College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China ([email protected]);

(3) Shilin Xiao, College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China ([email protected]);

(4) Shivan Prasad, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA ([email protected]);

(5) Wenyuan Xu, College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China ([email protected]);

(6) Kevin Fu, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA ([email protected]).


This paper is available on arxiv under ATTRIBUTION-NONCOMMERCIAL-NODERIVS 4.0 INTERNATIONAL license.

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